#### Technical Forecasting of Political Conflict

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Minnesota Political Methodology Colloquium University of Minnesota 13 April 2016

# PARUS

ANALYTICS

#### The Debate



ARGUMENT

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#### Why the World Can't Have a Nate Silver

The quants are riding high after Team Data crushed Team Gut in the U.S. election forecasts. But predicting the Electoral College vote is child's play next to some of these hard targets.

Vs.

BY JAY ULFELDER | NOVEMBER 8, 2012



ARGUMENT

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# Predicting the Future Is Easier Than It Looks

Nate Silver was just the beginning. Some of the same statistical techniques used by America's forecaster-in-chief are about to revolutionize world politics.

BY MICHAEL D. WARD , NILS METTERNICH | NOVEMBER 16, 2012

Two approaches that did not work well in the past

Two approaches that did not work well in the past

Qualitative

Two approaches that did not work well in the past

Qualitative

Quantitative

Tetlock: Experts typically do about as well as a "dart-throwing chimp"

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Except for television pundits, who do even worse. Ask President Romney. Or pretty much every Democratic Party pundit prior to the 2014 election. Or every 2015-2016 "Trump has peaked!" prediction.

The media want things to be dramatic. "We're all going to die! Details follow *American Idol*"

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Qualitative *theory* isn't much better: Remember the hegemonic US seizure of undefended Canadian and Mexican oil fields in response to the 1973 OPEC oil embargo?

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Neither do I.

### SMEs and the "narrative fallacy"



#### SME = "subject matter expert"

Hegel: the owl of Minerva flies only at dusk

Taleb (Black Swan): seeking out narratives is an almost unavoidable cognitive function and it generates a dopamine hit

Tetlock (Good Judgement Project): prior knowledge as a SME contributes only 2% to improved forecasting accuracy

#### This is your brain on narratives





Ward, Greenhill and Bakke (2010): Models based on significance tests don't predict well because that is not what a significance test is supposed to do.

Gill, Jeff. 1999. The Insignificance of Null Hypothesis Significance Testing. *Political Research Quarterly* 52:3, 647-674.

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Gill, Jeff. 1999. The Insignificance of Null Hypothesis Significance Testing. *Political Research Quarterly* 52:3, 647-674.

Frequentism is logically inconsistent and has been characterized in Meehl (1978) as "a terrible mistake, basically unsound, poor scientific strategy, and one of the worst things that ever happened in the history of psychology"

- ▶ Hey, dude, tell us what you *really* think...
- ▶ But that is another lecture...

Kahneman et al: people are really bad at statistical reasoning

- Everyone, including statisticians unless they focus very hard
- ► Example: managed mutual funds, which both theory and evidence indicate cannot work
- ► Example: opposition to "evidence based medicine" in the US, with a preference for clinical intuition even when this has been demonstrated to be less effective
- Probabilitistic weather forecasts seem to be the one major exception: rain likelihood, hurricane tracks

The Necessity of Prediction in Policy

Feedforward: policy choices must be made in the present for outcomes which may not occur for many years

Planning Times: even responses to current conditions may require lead times of weeks or months

## Factors encouraging technical political forecasting

- Conspicuous failures of existing methods: end of Cold War, post-invasion Iraq, Arab spring
- ▶ Success of forecasting models in other behavioral domains
  - ▶ Macroeconomic forecasting [maybe...]
  - ▶ Elections: Nate Silver effect
  - Demographic and epidemiological forecasting
  - ▶ Famine forecasting: USAID FEWS model
  - ► Example: statistical models for mortgage repayment were quite accurate
- Technological imperatives
  - Increased processing capacity
  - ▶ Information available on the web
- Decision-makers now expect visual displays of analytical information, which in turn requires systematic measurement
  - "They won't read things any more"

## This must be important: it's in *The Economist*!

#### The science of civil war

#### What makes heroic strife

# Computer models that can predict the outbreak and spread of civil conflict are being developed

Apr 21st 2012 | from the print edition





#### And The Chronicle!

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ovember 5, 2014

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#### **The Chronicle Review**

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October 13, 2014 Can We Predict the Next War?



Mark Shaver for The Chronicle Review

Enlarge Image

By Beth McMurtrie

E very minute of every day, computers overseen by Virginia Tech process billions of bits of data in an attempt to predict the future.

Tweets from politicians, satellite images of hospital parking lots, news stories about rising bus fares: All are mined, categorized, and fed into algorithms designed to anticipate the next flu outbreak or which candidate will win a city election. As many as 50 computer-generated

alerts flash daily on computer monitors and are evaluated for accuracy at the end of each month.

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## Large Scale Conflict Forecasting Projects

- ▶ State Failures Project 1994-2001
- ▶ Joint Warfare Analysis Center 1997
- ▶ FEWER [Davies and Gurr 1998]
- ▶ Center for Army Analysis 2002-2005
- ▶ Swiss Peace Foundation FAST 2000-2008
- ▶ Political Instability Task Force 2002-present
- ▶ DARPA ICEWS 2007-present
- ▶ IARPA ACE and OSI
- Peace Research Center Oslo (PRIO) and Uppsala University UCDP models
- ▶ US Holocaust Memorial Museum Prediction Poll

# Good Judgment Project (Tetlock, Meller et al)

- Evaluated about 2000 forecasts, typically with a 6 to 12 month window, across a wide variety political and economic domains
- ▶ Most forecasters—about 90%—were simply "dart-throwing chimps"
- ► "Superforecasters", however, consistently were about 80% to 85% accurate. This held across multiple years: unlike managed mutual funds, it did not regress to the mean
- ► Teams of superforecasters were more effective than individuals, and behaved differently than random teams
- Superforecasters have distinct psychological profiles: "foxes rather than hedgehogs"
- Prediction markets, SMEs and ensemble models provided only marginal improvements

Political behaviors are predictable! Superforecaster accuracy is similar to that of the PITF and ICEWS models.

## Political Instability Task Force

- ▶ US government, multi-agency: 1995-present
- Statistical modeling of various forms of state-level instability
- ▶ Forecasting models actively used since about 2005
  - ► Two year probability forecasts with roughly 80% accuracy (AUC)
  - Predominantly logistic models with a simple "standard PITF" set of variables; shifting to Bayesian approaches
  - ▶ (PITF has accumulated a set of 2700 variables but only a small number end up being important predictors)

## **PITF** Variables

# Variables Tested

CONCEPT	SELECTED EXAMPLES OF MEASURES TESTED	
state capacity	infant mortality, population, GDP, military personnel, polity durability	
violent conflict	civil war, armed attacks, regional conflicts, reported fatalities in political	
	violence, government mass killing	
non-violent challenges to	protests, strikes, government crises	
state authority		
government institutions	democracy, autocracy, factionalism, other polity measures	
ethnic relations	ethnic diversity, elite ethnicity, state-led discrimination	
demographics	youth-bulge	
international ties	GATT/WTO membership, trade-openness	

Two-year time horizon tends to favor structural variables Source: Ben Valentino and Chad Hazlett, "Forecasting Non-state Mass Killings", October 2012

#### PITF Results, ca. 2005

#### A Global Model for Forecasting Political Instability

Jack A. Goldstone George Mason University Robert H. Bates Harvard University David L. Epstein Columbia University Ted Robert Gurr University of Maryland Michael B. Lustik Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) Monty G. Marshall George Mason University Jay Ulfelder Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) Mark Woodward Arizona State University

Examining onsets of political instability in countries worldwide from 1955 to 2003, we develop a model that distinuishes countries that experienced instability from those that remained stable with a two-year lead time and over 80% accuracy. Intriguingly, the model uses few variables and a simple specification. The model is accurate in forecasting the onsets of both violent civil wars and nonviolent democratic reversals, suggesting common factors in both types of change. Whereast regime type is typically measured using linear or binary indicators of democracy/autocravy derived from the 21-point Polity scale, the model uses a nonlinear proceasegory measure of regime type based on the Polity components. This new measure of regime type emerges as the most powerful predictor of instability onsets, leading us to conclude that political institutions, properly specified, and not economic conditions, demography, or geography, are the most important predictors of the onset of political instibility.

Source: Amer J of Pol Sci Vol 54, no. 1, Jan 2010 pg. 190

#### Political Instability Task Force (AJPS 2010)

#### FORECASTING POLITICAL INSTABILITY

A. Countries That Had Instability Onsets, 1995–2004. Quintile/decile in model score rankings based on 2-yr. prior data						
Year	Top Decile	Second Decile	Second Quintile	Third Quintile		
1995	Armenia, Comoros	Belarus				
1996	Albania, Niger, Zambia		Nepal			
1997	Cambodia, Congo-Brazz.					
1998	Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho			Serbia/Montenegro		
1999	Ethiopia, Haiti					
2000		Solomon Ils., Guinea*				
2002	Cote d'Ivoire					
2003	Central African Republic					
2004	Iran*	Yemen*		Thailand*		

#### TABLE 2 Out-of-Sample Prediction Exercise for Observed Onsets of Instability, 1995–2004

B. Tabulation of All Country-years, 1995–2004. Model estimates based on censored data, using only sample data from prior to year of forecast (countries w/population over 500.000. no ongoing conflict. at least two years old)

	Countries with Instability in $t+2$	<b>Countries Remaining Stable</b>
Predicted for Instability (Top Quintile)	18	233
Predicted for Stability (Not Top Quintile)	3	992
N = 1,246 Percent Classed Correctly	85.7%	81.0%

Number of instability onsets, 1995-2004: 21. Number of instability onsets in top quintile of model scores: 18 (86%). \*Cases added to the problem set in 2005 update.

#### This is ca. 2010

201

### PITF Results, ca. 2005

	Full Problem Set		Civil War Onsets		Adverse Regime Change Onsets		
Independent Variables	Coefficient (S.E.)	Odds Ratio (95% CI)	Coefficient (S.E.)	Odds Ratio (95% CI)	Coefficient (S.E.)	Odds Ratio (95% CI)	
Regime Type (Full Autocracy as	Reference)						
Partial Autocracy	1.85***	6.37	1.94***	6,98	2.85***	17.32	
	(0.47)	(2.53, 16.02)	(0.62)	(2.05, 23.8)	(0.86)	(3.19, 94.0)	
Partial Democracy with	3.61***	36.91	3.35***	28.5	5.06***	157.0	
Factionalism	(0.51)	(13.5, 101)	(0.73)	(6.86, 118)	(1.02)	(21.1, 1164)	
Partial Democracy without	1.83***	6.22	.981	2.67	2.58***	13.23	
Factionalism	(0.54)	(2.17, 17.8)	(0.79)	(0.57, 12.4)	(0.91)	(2.20, 79.5)	
Full Democracy	0.981	2.67	.545	1.73	1.26	3.51	
	(0.68)	(0.70, 10.2)	(0.92)	(0.29, 10.4)	(1.09)	(0.42, 29.5)	
Infant Mortality†	1.59***	6.59	1.64***	4.19	1.38*	4.56	
	(0.35)	(2.91, 14.9)	(0.48)	(1.82, 9.60)	(0.58)	(1.30, 16.0)	
Armed Conflict in 4+	3.09***	22.0	2.81***	16.7	.091	1.10	
Bordering States	(0.95)	(3.42, 142)	(0.82)	(3.36, 83.0)	(1.49)	(0.06, 20.4)	
State-Led Discrimination	0.657*	1.93	1.17***	3.23	502	0.61	
	(0.30)	(1.08, 3.45)	(0.36)	(1.59, 6.55)	(0.62)	(0.18, 2.04)	
N = Total (Problems, Controls)	468 (117, 351)		260 (65, 195)		196 (49, 147)		
Onsets Correctly Classified	80	80.3%		80.0%		87.8%	
Controls Correctly Classified	81.8%		81.0%		87.8%		

#### TABLE 1 Results of Global Analysis of Onsets of Instability

\*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.01, \* p < 0.05. †Odds ratios for continuous variables compare cases at the 75th and 25th percentiles.

Source: Amer J of Pol Sci Vol 54, no. 1, Jan 2010 pg. 190

### Conjecture

For the possibly first time in history, we may be entering an era when foreign policy can be based on relatively accurate projections of the future rather than random guesses and ideologiy

"Possibly" since the superforecaster approach may have been independently discovered earlier, for example in Confucian and Venetian bureaucracies

Three other cases where "professional" advice was random or worse

- ▶ Medicine prior to sometime in the 20th century
- Managed mutual funds
- ► GRE scores (ouch!)

# "Schrodt should do everything in 'sevens"'

http://asecondmouse.org

## Opportunities

- ▶ Totalitarian law of the universe: whatever is not forbidden is mandatory. Prediction *is* scientific [now]
- ▶ Data: small, big, fast
- You can't solve everything with more machine cycles, but it never rarely hurts
- Successful large-scale projects: PITF, ICEWS, ACE/GJP, ENCoRe, OSI
- ► (Mostly) Convergent models
- ▶ Location, location, location
- ▶ Open source, open access, open collaboration

## Challenges

- Determining credible metrics
- Black swans
- ▶ Heterogeneous environments
- ► Absence of theories indicating what is and is not predictable
- Pournelle's Law: no task is so virtuous that it will not attract idiots
- ▶ Policy influence and ethical concerns

# **OPPORTUNITIES**

#### The Forecaster's Quartet

- Nassem Nicholas Taleb. The Black Swan (most entertaining obnoxious)
- Daniel Kahneman. Thinking Fast and Slow (30 years of research which won Nobel Prize)
- Philip Tetlock. Expert Political Judgment Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction (Tetlock and Dan Gardner) (most directly relevant)
- ▶ Nate Silver. *The Signal and the Noise* (high level of credibility after perfect 2012 electoral vote predictions)

Prediction is cool.

### Data!















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An Open-Source Application for Publishing, Citing and Discovering Research Data

> Universität Konstanz







Though this may be going a little far...

#### WIRED MAGAZINE: 16.07

Science : discoveries a

# The End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the Scientific Method Obsolete

By Chris Anderson 🖂 06.23.08



# Computing power

# **Computing Power**

Control Data Corporation 3600 (ca.1965) 32 K (48-bit) RAM memory 1 processor ~1-million operations per second Output: line printer


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Control Data Corporation 3600 (ca.1965) 32 K (48-bit) RAM memory 1 processor ~1-million operations per second Output: line printer







Penn State High Performance Computing Facility 15 cluster computers 100 to 2000 2.66 <u>Ghz</u> processors in each cluster ~50 Gb RAM accessible to each processor 130 Tb disk space 4 interactive visualization rooms

## **Computing Power**

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Motorola Razr 16 Gb RAM memory Dual processor ~500-milion operations per sec 540 x 860 color display

## **Open Source Software**



#### Computationally-intensive methods

- Bayesian estimation using Markov chain Monte Carlo methods
- ► Bayesian model averaging ("AJPS-as-algorithm")
- ▶ random forest models
- large-scale textual databases
- machine translation
- geospatial visualization
- ▶ real-time automated coding
- ▶ remote sensing data such as nightlight density

Convergent Results from Forecasting Projects-1

- ▶ Most models require only a [very] small number of variables
- ► Indirect indicators—famously, infant mortality rate as an indicator of development—are very useful
- ▶ Temporal autoregressive effects are huge: the challenge is predicting onsets and cessations, not continuations
- Spatial autoregressive effects—"bad neighborhoods"—are also huge
- Multiple modeling approaches generally converge to similar accuracy

Convergent Results from Forecasting Projects-2

- ▶ 80% to 85% accuracy—in the sense of AUC around 0.8— in the 6 to 24 month forecasting window occurs with remarkable consistency: few if any replicable models exceed this, and models below that level can usually be improved
- Measurement error on many of the dependent variables—for example casualties, coup attempts—is still very large
- ▶ Forecast accuracy does not decline very rapidly with increased forecast windows, suggesting long term structural factors rather than short-term "triggers" are dominant. Trigger models more generally do poorly except as *post hoc* "explanations."

#### Location: ACLED Geospatial



#### Location: UCDP Geospatial

Welcome to the UCDP GED - Uppsala Conflict Data Program's Georeferenced Event Dataset The interactive map below covers all the locations pecceded as part of GED. Drag and more the red and grey thumbs of the slider below to filter for particular latervals, years, or even particular months or days. Use the filters to select only one of the three UCDP types of violence. Cirking on each dot or pn will kingly information regarding events taking pice in these respective locations. Download data here. 1989 2010 Filter for: All violence O State-based conflicts only O Non-state conflicts only O One-sided conflicts only Map Satellite Libva Saudi Arabia uritania Yomen mercon Deaths (best estimate/event) Click on any pin/point Equatorial Guinea for details on events Gabon 1.9 0 10-24 0 25-49 0 50-249 Tanzania 250-999 1000+ eck Definitions for further details. **Zambia** Man data (17010 Data cocle, Insv/Geosistemps SRL MapT. MapLink, OR/ON-ME, Tele Atlas - Terbis of Use

The GED is the product of two and a half years of work at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University. The UCDP GED contains conflict data disaggregated spatially and temporally down to the level of the individual incidents of violence. For more details please see the About UCDP link above.

Open source, open access, open collaboration

- There is a strong if incomplete norm towards open sharing of data and methods
  - ▶ Unintended consequence: PITF "forecasting tournament" cannot be published in a major journal because it used proprietary data—the baseline data has 2,700 variables—that cannot be archived in replication sets. The results are, however, still available on SSRN.
  - The inability to share source texts is clearly a concern in news-report-based datasets such as ICEWS and MID, though URLs can be shared.
- By all available evidence, US government forecasting projects are using similar methodologies to those available in open sources; in fact they are probably lagging somewhat behind this
- ▶ We now have significant NGO and academic work, and an international "epistemic community" has developed around the topic.

# CHALLENGES

# Metrics

#### What is being predicted

- Probability of binary outcomes by a fixed date
- Quintile rankings of risk / probability-based "watch lists"
- Survival and hazard models
- Switching and phase models
- ▶ Networking—both social and geospatial—models

All of these can be used as input to ensemble methods

#### **Classification Matrix**

#### **Relationships among terms**

		Condition (as determined by "Gold standard")		
		Condition Positive	Condition Negative	
Test Outcome	Test Outcome Positive	True Positive	False Positive (Type I error)	Positive predictive value = Σ True Positive Σ Test Outcome Positive
	Test Outcome Negative	False Negative (Type II error)	True Negative	$\frac{\text{Negative predictive value} = }{\Sigma \text{ True Negative}}$ $\overline{\Sigma \text{ Test Outcome Negative}}$
		Sensitivity = Σ True Positive Σ Condition Positive	Specificity = Σ True Negative Σ Condition Negative	

#### ROC Curve





 $http://csb.stanford.edu/class/public/lectures/lec4/Lecture6/Data_Visualization/images/Roc_Curve\_Example and the standard standa$ 

#### Separation plots

<del>994</del>

BRIAN GREENHILL, MICHAEL D. WARD, AND AUDREY SACKS

TABLE 4 Rearrangement (and Coloring) of the Data Presented in Table 1 for Use in the Separation Plot

Country	Fitted Value ( )	Actual Outcome (y)
В	0.364	0
F	0.422	1
D	0.728	0
A	0.774	0
E	0.961	1
С	0.997	1

#### FIGURE 2 Separation Plot Representing the Data Presented in Table 1



#### FIGURE 4 Adding a Graph of $\hat{p}$ to the Separation Plot



#### And wait, there's still more!

- ▶ Recall / True Positive Rate/Sensitivity
- ▶ Precision / Positive predictive value (PPV)
- ▶ Specificity / True Negative Rate
- ▶ F1 score: harmonic mean of precision and recall
- Brier scores
- Posterior probabilities
- Proportional reduction of error or entropy
- ▶ Deviation from perfect calibration curve

#### Black swans

Ideal forecasting targets are neither too common nor too rare



### Black swan: Irene Country Lodge, 19 May 2014



#### The Forecasting Zoo





#### Ducks can be interesting...



Size



Variety



Quantity



Suspicious behaviors

And this is going too far...

#### DARPA-World!



By definition, most black swans *will not occur*! So there is little point in investing a large amount of effort trying to predict them.

# And this is going too far...

### DARPA-World!



By definition, most black swans *will not occur*! So there is little point in investing a large amount of effort trying to predict them.

"Can your model predict a chemical attack by self-recruited Mexican jihadis working as rodeo clowns in Evanston, Wyoming? Why not?!"

#### Challenge: distinguishing black swans from rare events

Black swan: an event that has a low probability even conditional on other variables

Rare event: an event that occurs infrequently, but conditional on an appropriate set of variables, does not have a low probability

Medical analogy: certain rare forms of cancer appear to be highly correlated with specific rare genetic mutations. Conditioned on those mutations, they are not black swans.

Another important category: high probability events which are ignored. The "sub-prime mortgage crisis" was the result of the failure of a large number of mortgage which models had completely accurately identified as "sub-prime" and thus likely to fail. This was not a low probability event. Upton Sinclair: It is hard to persuade someone to believe something when he can make a great deal of money not believing it.

#### Heterogeneous environments

- Per Pinker, Goldstein, Mueller, etc, is the system changing significantly while we are trying to model it? How far back are data still relevant?
- ▶ How different are various types of militarized non-state actors? For example, how much do al-Qaeda and international narcotics networks have in common?
- We are also using a more heterogenous set of forecasting methods, and probably do not understand their weak points as well as we understand those of regression-based models.
- ▶ Threats tend to occur in small number of "hot-spots"
  - Europe 1910-1945
  - ▶ Middle East 1965-present
  - Balkans in 1990s
  - Internal conflict in India

Note that all of these are complicated by rare events—some of which may be black swans—since it limits the number of observations we have on the dependent variable. Changing nature of conflict-1

#### Threats in 1910

- "Gunboat diplomacy" was an accepted norm, as were elements of bellicism and social Darwinism
- ▶ Some competition occurred between approximate equals
- Mediation was *ad hoc* with no established international institutions
- ▶ Territorial change was credible
- ▶ Military actors are almost exclusively states

Changing nature of conflict-2

Threats in 2015

- ▶ Highly asymmetric distribution of military power
- ► Threats get almost immediate attention from potential mediators, including the UN
- Non-military sanctions are credible (Libya, Iraq, Iran, probably Russia)
- ▶ Territorial changes are rare and highly problematic
- ▶ Non-state actors can exercise substantial military force

# Theory: what can and cannot be predicted?

#### Is astronomy scientific?

Astronomy generally has a very good record of prediction, and from the earliest days of astronomy, successful prediction has been a key legitimating factor

- ▶ relation between star positions and the Nile flood
- ► eclipses
- ▶ orbits
- ▶ Halley's comet
- precision steering of space-craft

### Is astronomy scientific?

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Nonetheless, astronomy cannot predict, nor does it attempt to predict:

- ▶ solar flares, despite their potentially huge economic consequences
- previously unseen comets
- next nearby supernova: the end of the 410-year supernova peace

"[Following 30 years of observations] When all known forces acting on the spacecraft are taken into consideration, a very small but unexplained force remains. It appears to cause a constant sunward acceleration of  $(8.74\pm1.33)\times10^{-10}m/s^2$  for both spacecraft."

Source: Wikipedia

#### Irreducible sources of error-1

- Specification error: no model of a complex, open system can contain all of the relevant variables;
- ▶ Measurement error: with very few exceptions, variables will contain some measurement error
  - presupposing there is even agreement on what the "correct" measurement is in an ideal setting;
  - Predictive accuracy is limited by the square root of measurement error: in a bivariate model if your reliability is 80%, your accuracy can't be more than 90%
  - ▶ This biases the coefficient estimates as well as the predictions
- Quasi-random structural error: Complex and chaotic deterministic systems behave as if they were random under at least some parameter combinations. Chaotic behavior can occur in equations as simple as  $x_{t+1} = ax_t^2 + bx_t$

#### Open, complex systems



#### **WORKING DRAFT - V3**

### Irreducible sources of error-2

- Rational randomness such as that predicted by mixed strategies in zero-sum games
- ▶ Arational randomness attributable to free-will
  - Rule-of-thumb from our rat-running colleagues:
     "A genetically standardized experimental animal, subjected to carefully controlled stimuli in a laboratory setting, will do whatever it wants."
- ► Effective policy response:
  - in at least some instances organizations will have taken steps to head off a crisis that would have otherwise occurred.
- ▶ The effects of natural phenomenon
  - ► the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami dramatically reduced violence in the long-running conflict in Aceh

(Tetlock (2013) independently has an almost identical list of the irreducible sources of error.)

Balancing factors which make behavior predictable

- ► Individual preferences and expectations, which tend to change very slowly
- ▶ Organizational and bureaucratic rules and norms
- Constraints of mass mobilization strategies
- Structural constraints: the Maldives will not respond to climate-induced sea level rise by building a naval fleet to conquer Singapore.
- ▶ Choices and strategies at Nash equilibrium points
- Autoregression (more a result than a cause)
- ▶ Network and contagion effects (same)

"History doesn't repeat itself but it rhymes" Mark Twain (also occasionally attributed to Friedrich Nietzsche)

### Paradox of political prediction

Political behaviors are generally highly incremental and vary little from day to day, or even century to century (Putnam).

Nonetheless, we *perceive* politics as very unpredictable because we focus on the unexpected (Kahneman).

Consequently the only "interesting" forecasts are those which are least characteristic of the system as a whole. However, only some of those changes are actually predictable.

#### Finding a non-trivial forecast



- ► Too frequent: prediction is obvious without technical assistance
- ► Too rare: prediction may be correct, but the event is so infrequent that
  - ▶ The prediction is irrelevant to policy
  - ▶ Calibration can be very tricky
  - Accuracy of the model is difficult to assess
- "Just right": these are situations where typical human accuracy is likely to be flawed, and consequently these could have a high payoff, but there are not very many of them.
## Differing attitudes towards error

Geography:

▶ Progress consists of ever more accurate data

Political science:

 Trust nothing—everything has error, just control for the systematic biases

Machine learning::

▶ it is what it is: goal is improving prediction

Statistics::

- ▶ signal to noise: Perfect is the enemy of "good enough"
- ▶ mathematically approximate the characteristics of the error
- ▶ Taleb, Mandelbrot: don't be a Gaussian in a power-law world

### Models matter

Arab Spring is an unprecedented product of the new social media

- Model used by Chinese censors of NSM: King, Peng, Roberts 2012
- ▶ Next likely candidates: Africa

Arab Spring is an example of an instability contagion/diffusion process

- Eastern Europe 1989-1991, OECD 1968, CSA 1859-1861, Europe 1848, Latin America 1820-1828
- ▶ Next likely candidates: Central Asia

Arab Spring is a black swan

▶ There is no point in modeling black swans, you instead build systems robust against them

### Are trigger models simply a cognitive illusion?

- ▶ Human experts *assert* they are basing predictions on trigger sequences but is may simply be an artifact of the dominance of episodic associative memory (Kahneman)
- ► To date, statistical studies have not found that detailed event-based models provide a predictive advantages over structural models at the 6 to 24 month horizon
  - Event data can *substitute* for structural data, so it necessarily contains meaningful information. But it doesn't appear to contain *additional* information.
  - However, this is using traditional aggregated linear time series models: sequence-based methods might do better

### Excuse me if you've heard this one already...





# Statistical and modeling challenges

Rare events

- ► Incorporate much longer historical time lines?—Schelling used Caesar's *Gallic Wars* to analyze nuclear deterrence
- ▶ New approaches made possible by computational advances

Analysis of event sequences, which are not a standard data type

- ▶ There are, however, a large number of available methods, and it is just possible that these will work with very large data sets
- ▶ This possibility will be discussed in detail in Lecture 5

Causality

▶ Oxford *Handbook of Causation* is 800 pages long

Integration of qualitative and qualitative/subject-matter-expert (SME) information

 Bayesian approaches using prior probabilities are promising but to date they have not really been used Making this relevant to the policy community

This is a two-way street.

- The conflict policy community needs to become as sophisticated in evaluating and integrating quantitative models as their counterparts are in economics and public health.
- Academic researchers need to focus on questions and methods relevant to policy and not just "interesting." And/or easy to study. And/or publishable after a five-year lag. And/or accessible only on a publisher's web site for a \$40 per article fee.
- Both sides need to work on common standards for evaluating the quantity and robustness of results.
- ▶ Both sides need to understand the vocabularies, incentives and cultures of the other.

# Pournelle's Law:

# No task is so virtuous that it will not attract idiots

- Need to establish with the media and policy-makers that not every forecast, especially those made using "Big Data" methods, is scientifically valid
  - ▶ It took the survey research community about thirty to forty years to establish professional credibility, though they have largely succeeded
- Conveying limitations of the methods against the hyperconfidence of pundits and individuals with secret models
  - ▶ Limitations of the data sources
  - ▶ Limitations of data coding, particularly when automated
  - Limitations of the model estimation
  - ► Limitations of probabilistic forecasts, particularly for rare events, even when the models are correct
- Getting past media bias towards sensationalistic and frightening stories—"New research: We're all going to die!!" (which is true, but probably not in the manner relevant to the advertised story.)

# Ethical concerns

- Thus far, we've generally had the luxury of no one paying attention to any of our predictions : what if governments do start paying attention?
  - "Policy relevant forecast interval" is around 6 to 24 months
  - ▶ USAID/FAO famine forecasting model
  - It is *possible* that our models could become less accurate because crises are being averted, but I don't see that happening any time soon.
- Difficulties in getting *anyone*, including experts (see Kahneman, Tetlock), to correctly interpret probabilistic forecasts
- Possible impact on sources
  - Local collaborators
  - ▶ Journalists (cf. Mexico)
  - ▶ NGOs to the extent we are using their information

Memo to potential funding agencies: We aren't exactly over-spending on this topic

- ► A \$1-million investment in research *might* avoid a \$10-million mistake in policy. Or a \$10-million investment in research might avoid a \$4-trillion mistake in policy.
- Every half hour of every business day, the amount Google spends on the study of human behavior is roughly the same as the entire political science research budget of the United States National Science Foundation (\$8-million).

400 Years Ago: Francis Bacon establishes principles of modern science

New Method (Novum Organum) [1620]

- Scientific method based on the primacy of observation and induction
- Science should be open, in contrast to the secrecy of the alchemists
- Science should benefit society as a whole—also a contrast to the alchemists—and is deserving of state support

## Thank you

Email: schrodt735@gmail.com

Slides: http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/presentations.html

Links to data and software: http://philipschrodt.org

Blog: http://asecondmouse.org